University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 52
2018

Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings
Andrew N. Vollmer
University of Virginia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Securities Law Commons,
and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew N. Vollmer, Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings, 52 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 103 (2018).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol52/iss1/4

https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.52.1.accusers
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ACCUSERS AS ADJUDICATORS IN AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS
Andrew N. Vollmer*
ABSTRACT
Largely because of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Withrow v. Larkin, the accepted view for decades has been that a federal administrative agency
does not violate the Due Process Clause by combining the functions of investigating, charging, and then resolving allegations that a person violated the law. Many
federal agencies have this structure, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission.
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania, a judicial
disqualification case that, without addressing administrative agencies, nonetheless
raises a substantial question about one aspect of the combination of functions at
agencies. The Court held that due process prevented a judge from sitting in a case
in which he had participated as district attorney years earlier. The operative principle for the decision was that “the Court has determined that an unconstitutional
potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case.”
This Article concludes that the reasoning of Williams should supersede
Withrow on the need to disqualify a specific commissioner or agency head from
participating in a particular adjudication if the agency official played a meaningful role, such as voting to approve enforcement charges, in the process leading to
the agency’s initiation of proceedings against the defendant. Voting to approve enforcement charges would be a meaningful role. The due process cases do not permit
a compromise on the high standards of impartiality demanded of a final agency
decision maker in an adjudication to determine whether a private party committed
a violation of law.
That reading of Williams threatens to unsettle standard practices at various
agencies, but a closer look at the procedures of the SEC shows that it would be able
to accommodate the rule in Williams yet retain the combination of charging and
adjudicating at the Commission level. Because of turnover of Commissioners and
quorum rules, the SEC could continue to have the agency leaders bring enforcement
cases and review nearly all administrative law judge decisions while disqualifying
individual Commissioners under Williams when necessary.

* Professor of Law, General Faculty, and Director of the John W. Glynn, Jr. Law &
Business Program, University of Virginia School of Law; former Deputy General Counsel of
the Securities and Exchange Commission; and former partner in the securities enforcement
practice of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.
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INTRODUCTION
The standard practice at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is for the Commissioners both to
charge a person with a violation of law and then sit as judges to de1
cide whether the defendant committed the violation. Often, one
or more SEC Commissioners at the time of the initial charge are
still Commissioners later when the Commission reviews an initial
decision from an administrative law judge in the same case. When
that occurs, the Commissioners who participated in the decision to
initiate an enforcement proceeding also participate in the agency’s
final decision on disposition of the charge. Other federal agencies,
1. See infra text accompanying notes 169–76; Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and
Judge, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014, 7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-thesec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-1407195362.
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such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communi2
cations Commission, follow similar procedures.
This combination of roles and powers might surprise some, but
constitutional and administrative law has long accepted that the
leaders of a federal agency may investigate and charge a person
with a violation of law and then later act in a judicial capacity in
the same case. The primary sources of that understanding are a
3
section of the Administrative Procedure Act and Withrow v. Larkin.
In that 1975 decision, the Supreme Court held that a state medical
examining board would not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution by investigating and charging potential misconduct by
a doctor and then determining that the doctor should be tempo4
rarily suspended because of the misconduct. Lower federal courts
later extended the rule of Withrow to federal administrative agen5
cies.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 164–68.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012) provides that an “employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that
or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision,
or agency review [of an initial decision], except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.” The restriction does not apply “to the agency or a member or members of the body
comprising the agency.” Id.
4. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
5. See, e.g., NEC Corp. v. United States, 151 F.3d 1361, 1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (using
Withrow to deny a due process challenge to the role of the Department of Commerce in an
anti-dumping determination and noting that “the blend of investigative and adjudicative
functions sometimes found in modern administrative agencies requires that a pragmatic
approach be taken to what qualifies as an ‘impartial’ decision maker”); Keating v. OTS, 45
F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the contention that the first director of OTS exercised
an impermissible combination of investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions at
least in part because the second OTS director issued a final decision); In re Seidman, 37 F.3d
911 (3d Cir. 1994) (using Withrow to reject a due process challenge to the combination of
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication functions in the OTS director); Simpson v.
OTS, 29 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1994) (using Withrow and the minimal involvement of the OTS
director in the commencement and prosecution of the case to reject a due process challenge based on the combination of prosecution and adjudication); Blinder, Robinson & Co.
v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (using Withrow, 5 U.S.C. § 554, and the core value of
flexibility in modern administrative process to reject a due process challenge to an SEC administrative proceeding); NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1977) (using Withrow and 5 U.S.C. § 554 to reject a due process challenge when the Regional Director
of the NLRB “exercised both investigative and adjudicative responsibilities in connection
with the issuance and resolution of [an] unfair labor practice complaint”); see also Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 79 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission
combines the functions of investigator, prosecutor and judge and . . . Congress designed it
in that manner. Thus Kennecott’s complaint goes to the nature of the law itself. As to this,
the courts have uniformly held that this feature does not make out an infringement of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch.,
404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (using precedent and 5 U.S.C. § 554 to conclude that
Congress had approved the combination of an agency’s power to act in an accusatory capacity and to determine the merits of the charges, concluding that a combination of investigative and judicial functions within an agency did not violate due process, and rejecting the
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Notwithstanding its application by the courts, Withrow is one of
the Supreme Court decisions at the heart of a long-running debate
about the extent to which the Constitution permits or forbids a
federal administrative agency from exercising legislative functions,
judicial functions, or a combination of them in one agency with
executive duties. The debate provokes arguments about the separation of powers, separation of functions, checks and balances, due
process, pragmatism and efficiency. It spans a range of theories
from the formalist view of separated powers to a functionalist ap6
proach supporting workable government.
The debate now has new material to digest. In 2016, the Su7
preme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania, which put the established understanding of Withrow in doubt, at least in part. Williams held that the Due Process Clause required a state supreme
court justice to disqualify himself from reviewing a collateral challenge to a defendant’s conviction and death sentence because,
years earlier, the judge had participated in the criminal prosecution of the defendant as district attorney. The operative principle
for the decision was that “the Court has determined that an unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as
8
both accuser and adjudicator in a case.”
The reasoning of Williams naturally raises the question whether
it applies to federal administrative agencies, such as the SEC,
whose heads both charge and adjudicate. Does Williams create a
new due process imperative that federal agencies must meet, or
was there something about the law or facts in Williams that prevents
the outcome from extending to agencies and qualifying Withrow?

argument that an agency’s issuance of a press release about the charges in a complaint created an unacceptable appearance of prejudgment because agency members were then “under a very real pressure to vindicate themselves and justify the charges”).
6. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014); Michael
Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981); Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication
Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023 (2016); Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1839 (2011); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488
(1987); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa:
The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE L. J. 384 (2012); see also Martin H. Redish & Kristin
McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the Administrative State, Nw U. Pritzker Sch. L. Pub. L.
& Legal Theory Series No. 18-03 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3122697.
7. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
8. Id. at 1905.
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Perhaps Williams did not implicate Withrow at all. Williams was different from Withrow in several obvious ways: Williams involved a
judge, a criminal case for the death penalty, and collateral relief in
state court. Withrow was a proceeding by an administrative agency
to suspend a medical license, and the Court has often acknowledged that the demands of the Due Process Clause vary with the
circumstances.
This Article will discuss whether Williams affects our understanding of Withrow and the established position that a federal agency
may charge and adjudicate the same case. It concludes that Williams should supersede Withrow and require the disqualification of
a specific commissioner or agency head from participation in an
adjudication if the agency official played a meaningful role in the
process leading to the agency’s initiation of proceedings against
the defendant. The Article will discuss whether voting to approve
enforcement charges qualifies as a meaningful role. The due process cases on disqualification do not permit a compromise on the
high standards of impartiality demanded of a final agency decision
maker in an adjudication to determine whether a private party
committed a violation of law.
Applying Williams to federal agencies does not necessarily mean
a complete renunciation of Withrow or of the combination of
charging and adjudicating functions within a single agency. Williams dealt with the specific circumstances of an individual accuser
turned adjudicator. It was not about whether an entire agency carries an inherent bias from the combination of functions or whether the Constitution’s structure of separated powers prevents Congress from authorizing a single agency to charge a violation of law
and then adjudicate the charge.
Part I of this Article will review and comment on the two key Supreme Court decisions, Withrow and Williams. Reconciling the reasoning of the two decisions is difficult, but the two cases illustrate
the difference between a narrow claim that an individual decision
maker should be disqualified because specific circumstances create
a strong risk of bias or partiality and the broader argument that the
Due Process Clause or the Constitution’s separation of powers does
not permit an enforcement agency to adjudicate claims it brought.
The discussion in this Article is limited to the narrower, individual
due process claim and does not address whether the combination
of enforcement and adjudication in one agency violates the Constitution.
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Part II then considers whether Williams applies to federal administrative agencies. This Part considers possible ways to distinguish
the two decisions but concludes that Williams reflects an evolving
concern with the likelihood of partiality that grows out of service as
an advocate. The principles in Williams and other due process cases
on the need for impartial decision makers apply to administrative
agencies, at least when an agency such as the SEC commences an
enforcement claim through an internal administrative process that
culminates in final agency review by the most senior agency officials. This discussion also reports data from several studies that
support the Supreme Court’s concern that an accuser lacks the
necessary neutrality to determine the merits of an initial charging
decision.
Part II concludes by examining the needs of the modern administrative state and the pragmatic considerations favoring the combination of charging and adjudicating functions in an agency. It
asserts that practical considerations should and can give way to the
application of Williams. It also explains that some agencies, such as
the SEC, would be able to accommodate the rule in Williams and
continue to have agency leaders bring enforcement cases and review nearly all decisions of administrative law judges (ALJs).
Finally, Part III assumes that Williams extends to federal agencies. It addresses the ways in which the Williams rule would apply to
the SEC and the adjustments the SEC could make to its procedures
to comply. If the rule in Williams applies to federal agencies, it
would apply to the SEC whose Commissioners act as both accuser
and adjudicator. Then, this Part considers the way Williams would
have affected three specific SEC administrative proceedings. Because of turnover on the Commission and the SEC’s quorum rules,
applying Williams would rarely disable the agency from issuing a final adjudication on the merits of an administrative proceeding.
The procedures administrative agencies use is a large topic, and
this Article does not set out to discuss the full range of potential issues. Three factors limit the scope of this discussion.
First, the Article addresses only those situations in which the
agency head or the individuals constituting the leadership of the
agency participate in both a decision to initiate an enforcement
claim against a third party and then participate in an adjudication
proceeding to determine liability or the appropriate sanction. At
the SEC, agency leadership means the Commissioners, who are
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appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 9 This Article does not address the position of agency personnel or adjudicators subordinate to the top officials of an agency. For example, at
the SEC and many agencies, an ALJ renders an initial decision in
an administrative enforcement proceeding, and the Commission10
ers may review that initial decision. This Article does not address
lower level employees because section 554(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act prohibits agency personnel who perform investigating or prosecuting functions in a case from participating in or advising on an adjudication decision in the same case or a factually
related case, but the prohibition does not apply to the agency or
11
agency heads.
Second, this Article addresses government enforcement cases
brought as administrative proceedings. These are situations in
which a government agency charges a specific person with a violation of law because of particular past conduct, litigates the case
within the agency, and renders a decision on whether a violation
occurred and what sanction or relief to impose. SEC administrative
enforcement cases can lead to severe forms of coercive sanctions
and resemble criminal prosecutions in many ways. Many agency
enforcement cases brought as administrative proceedings, such as
the ones at the SEC, involve a hearing on the record and are adju12
dications under the APA; they are not license hearings, rulemakings, or rulings on government benefits.
Third, the reasoning and analysis in this Article apply only to
federal agencies with two characteristics: (1) those that use administrative proceedings to resolve meaningful enforcement allegations and (2) those whose top-level officials vote to initiate enforcement proceedings and make the final agency determination
on a potential violation. The SEC is a leading example of such an
agency, and the details of its operations are used to illustrate the
implications of applying Williams to an agency’s procedures. Other

9. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 510–13 (2010).
10. Other works devote attention to the position of administrative law judges, administrative judges, or agency staff. See Asimow, supra note 6 (addressing primarily the separation
of staff from decision making); Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1643 (2016); Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797 (2013);
Michael Asimow, Evidentiary Hearings Outside the Administrative Procedure Act, ADMIN.
CONFERENCE U.S. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
adjudication-outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-final-report_0.pdf.
11. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d); see discussion supra note 3.
12. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(7), 554(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77u, 78u-2(a), 78u-3(a), 78v
(2012).
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agencies appear to have a similar structure and to operate in a similar manner. Part III of this Article describes some of the relevant
procedures of several other agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, but the particular processes of those agencies would
need to be considered to reach a fully informed conclusion about
whether and how Williams would apply.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN WITHROW AND WILLIAMS

This first Part describes Withrow and Williams. This review
prompts several observations that bear on the later, essential question of whether the holding in Williams should apply to federal
administrative agencies.
A. Withrow v. Larkin
In Withrow v. Larkin, a doctor challenged the procedures used by
the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board to enforce state statutes
against various types of professional misconduct. 13 The doctor’s objection was that the Board had the authority to investigate possible
prohibited acts, issue charges, and then reach a conclusion on rep14
rimanding him or temporarily suspending his medical license.
The Board held an investigative hearing to determine if the doctor had engaged in prohibited acts in the course of his work. It
then proposed to hold a “contested hearing” on charges resulting
from the investigation and decide whether to suspend the doctor’s
15
license temporarily. The doctor sought relief from a federal district court, which stopped the Board from imposing a temporary
suspension because the Board was not “an independent, neutral
16
and detached decision maker.” The district court concluded that
a Board decision to suspend the doctor’s medical license “at its
own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investiga-

13. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
14. Id. at 41.
15. Id. at 40–41; Larkin v. Withrow, 368 F. Supp. 796, 797 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Brief for
Appellee at 14, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (No. 73-1573), 1974 WL 186368, at
*14 (“The issues involved in the contested hearing were identical to the issues which had
been investigated by the Board.”).
16. Withrow, 368 F. Supp. at 797; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 41–42.
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tion would constitute a denial to him of his rights to procedural
17
due process.”
After the district court enjoined the temporary suspension proceedings, the Board held another investigative session and then issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision that the
doctor had engaged in specified misconduct. The Board also determined that it had probable cause for an action to revoke the
doctor’s medical license and filed its decision with the local district
attorney to initiate appropriate revocation or criminal proceed18
ings. Permanent license revocation or a criminal conviction
needed a court action prosecuted by the district attorney.
The Board appealed the district court’s judgment to the Supreme Court, and the Court rejected the due process argument in
a unanimous opinion by Justice White. The Court began by acknowledging that administrative adjudications must be fair and
19
must have an unbiased decision maker. The Court identified previous situations “in which experience teaches that the probability
of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high
20
to be constitutionally tolerable.” The earlier situations occurred
21
when an adjudicator had a pecuniary interest in the outcome and
when the adjudicator had been the target of personal abuse or crit22
icism from a party.
The combination in an administrative agency of the authority to
investigate, commence proceedings, and adjudicate was different.
Unlike the situations previously identified, the Court did not believe it created an unconstitutional risk of bias.
The contention that the combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a
much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those
serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers

17. Withrow, 368 F. Supp. at 797; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 42.
18. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 41–42.
19. Id. at 46–47.
20. Id. at 47.
21. The Court cited Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927), among other cases. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 n.14.
22. The Court cited Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,
400 U.S. 455 (1971), among other cases. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 n.15.
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on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implement23
ed.
The Court conceded that the argument against allowing the
24
combination of functions had merit. “The issue is substantial,”
but, when the question concerned the operations of administrative
agencies, legislators needed freedom to choose from complete
separation of functions or virtually none at all. The “growth, variety, and complexity of the administrative processes have made any
25
one solution highly unlikely.” At the federal level, Congress had
passed section 554(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
explicitly permitted the members of a federal agency to investigate
26
or prosecute and participate or advise in adjudication.
The doctor relied on the Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in
27
Murchison, where the Court held that the Due Process Clause
prohibited a state court judge acting as a one-person grand jury
from hearing witnesses, charging witnesses with perjury or contempt, and then trying the charges against the witnesses. The
Court responded by saying that Murchison did not stand for a broad
rule against the combination of functions at an administrative
agency, did not question the APA or an earlier Court decision
permitting agency members from having some knowledge of facts
28
relevant to an adjudication, and involved different procedures. It
concluded the Board in Withrow used procedures that did not contain an unacceptable risk of bias.
The Court appeared to demand proof that members of the
Board held an actual personal bias or prejudice against the doctor
or had prejudged the outcome of the doctor’s case based on the
29
information from the investigation. The mere exposure to evi23. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.
24. Id. at 51.
25. Id. at 51–52.
26. Id. at 52. The Court also relied on the approval of the combination of functions by
the leading commentator on the administrative process at the time, Kenneth Culp Davis.
The Court cited the Davis treatise several times. Id. at 52 nn.17–18, 57 n.24 (citing 2
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958 & Supp. 1970)).
27. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 53; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
28. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 53 (discussing FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948)).
29. Id. at 54–55 (“When the Board instituted its investigative procedures, it stated only
that it would investigate . . . . Later, . . . it would determine if violations had been committed . . . . Without doubt, the Board then anticipated . . . an adjudication of the issue; but
there was no more evidence of bias . . . than inhered in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate.”).
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dence presented in a non-adversary investigation was not sufficient
to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary
hearing. The Board members and other administrators should be
30
assumed to be conscientious and intellectually disciplined.
The Court then rejected the argument that the Board’s filing of
probable cause conclusions with the district attorney demonstrated
prejudice and prejudgment. Different stages of a proceeding, such
as initial charges and ultimate adjudication, have different bases
and purposes and could legitimately lead to different results from
“a more complete view of the evidence afforded by an adversary
31
hearing.” The risk of bias or prejudgment in deciding whether a
violation occurred after having filed a complaint “has not been
considered to be intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great
possibility that the adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed posi32
tion.”
In summary, Withrow was a rousing defense of the administrative
state and Congress’s ability to authorize an agency to investigate,
charge, and resolve allegations of misconduct. The Court elevated
legal formalities over the psychological tendencies and human
weaknesses of individuals, praised the honesty and intellectual discipline of agency adjudicators, and diminished due process precedents.
B. Williams v. Pennsylvania
33

In Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution forbids a person from being both an accuser and adjudicator in the same case. The case
concerned a local district attorney who approved a decision to seek
the death penalty against a criminal defendant and then, many
years later, participated as a judge in a court decision that refused
to grant the defendant post-conviction relief.
Pennsylvania charged the defendant with a 1984 murder. The
trial prosecutor wrote a memorandum to her supervisors requesting permission to seek the death penalty. The district attorney

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 57.
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
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wrote a note at the bottom of the memorandum approving the request. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death in
34
1986. The district attorney did not participate in the litigation
35
other than to approve the request to seek the death penalty.
For over twenty-five years, the defendant challenged his conviction and sentence. In 2012, he filed a petition for post-conviction
relief claiming newly discovered evidence. The state trial court
found misconduct by the trial prosecutor and ordered a new sentencing hearing. The case went to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania where the district attorney who had approved seeking the
death penalty was now chief justice. The defendant asked the chief
justice to disqualify himself. He refused and voted with the other
five members of the state supreme court to reinstate the death
36
penalty.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision written by
Justice Kennedy, held that the Due Process Clause required the
disqualification of the state chief justice. A judge must be free of
bias. That determination required an objective standard: Would an
average judge likely be neutral or have an unconstitutional potential for bias from a financial or other interest in the outcome of a
37
case.
The Murchison precedent, which Withrow had distinguished,
38
played an important role in Williams. In Williams, the Court said
Murchison “determined that an unconstitutional potential for bias
exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator
39
in a case.”
The Williams majority, using language from Withrow and Murchison, gave weight to an advocate’s psychological investment and personal knowledge:
When a judge has served as an advocate for the State in the
very case the court is now asked to adjudicate, a serious
question arises as to whether the judge, even with the most
diligent effort, could set aside any personal interest in the
outcome. There is, furthermore, a risk that the judge

34. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No. 155040), 2015 WL 10356400.
35. Brief for Respondent at 17, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No.
15-5040), 2016 WL 355062.
36. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1904–05.
37. Id. at 1905–06.
38. Id. at 1905–07; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
39. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905.
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“would be so psychologically wedded” to his or her previous
position as a prosecutor that the judge “would consciously
or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or
changed position.” In addition, the judge’s “own personal
knowledge and impression” of the case, acquired through
his or her role in the prosecution, may carry far more
weight with the judge than the parties’ arguments to the
40
court.
The Court cited no empirical research or studies to bolster these
41
conclusions, although supporting data exists, as discussed below.
The Williams Court recognized that the state chief justice was
just one of several prosecutors who worked on the case, played only a limited role, and ended his involvement decades earlier. Nonetheless, “the constitutional principles” were fully applicable when
“a judge had a direct, personal role in the defendant’s prosecu42
tion.” What mattered was whether the adjudicator participated in
43
a “critical” or “major adversary decision.” “A prosecutor may bear
responsibility for any number of critical decisions, including what
charges to bring, whether to extend a plea bargain, and which wit44
nesses to call.” Brief, administrative or ministerial acts do not
45
qualify. When a serious risk exists that a person would be influenced by a motive, even inadvertent, to validate prior involvement,
the person has a “duty to withdraw in order to ensure the neutrality of the judicial process in determining the consequences that his
46
or her own earlier, critical decision may have set in motion.” An
individual is not able to set aside personal interest in an outcome
when he or she has served as an advocate in the very case being ad47
judicated.
The Court concluded that the chief justice’s authorization to
seek the death penalty amounted to significant and personal involvement in a critical trial decision and gave rise to an unacceptable risk of actual bias. His participation in the proceedings as a jus48
tice on the state supreme court violated due process.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1906 (citations omitted).
See infra Part II.C.
Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906.
Id.
Id. at 1907.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1906.
Id. at 1908–09.
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The violation was not harmless error even though six state supreme court justices decided the case and the chief justice’s vote
49
was not decisive. The existence of harm did not depend on
whether the chief justice influenced the other justices during the
decision-making process or whether the disqualified judge’s vote
was necessary to the disposition of the case. The decision of a body
with several members reflects a collective process of exchanging
ideas and arguments with each person playing a part in shaping
the ultimate disposition. “Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial
50
pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself.”
Chief Justice Roberts, together with Justice Alito, dissented and
would not have found a due process violation because the state
chief justice did not have any previous knowledge of the facts contested in the specific issue that the state supreme court reviewed
51
and had not made any previous decision on that issue. Justice
Thomas also dissented because the post-conviction proceedings
were different from the original criminal case, the state chief justice did not participate as a prosecutor in the post-conviction proceeding, and the Due Process Clause required disqualification only
when a judge had a direct and substantial pecuniary interest or
52
had served as a lawyer in the same case.
C. Comments on Withrow and Williams
Through the lens of Williams, a large part of Withrow appears to
be wounded. The reasoning in the two opinions is hard to reconcile, as four aspects of the opinions illustrate. The fifth comment
below observes that comparing Withrow and Williams accentuates
the difference between a due process disqualification of an individual decision maker for partiality in particular circumstances and
a broader separation of powers or due process challenge to an
agency’s combined authority to investigate, commence proceedings, and adjudicate.
First, Withrow and Williams had similar basic fact patterns and
stated the same legal standards for disqualification but reached entirely different outcomes. Withrow said that due process required

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1909.
Id.
Id. at 1910–11 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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disqualification when “the probability of actual bias on the part of
the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally toler53
able.” Williams began with the same general due process principle
54
and quoted Withrow.
Withrow professed to make “a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness” but concluded that the sequence
of functions of investigating, charging, and deciding did not create
an intolerably high risk “that the adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously or
unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed
55
position.” Williams considered the human tendency to be psychologically wedded to a position and reached the opposite conclusion. Serving as a judge after having been an advocate in the same
case created an unacceptable “risk that the judge ‘would be so psychologically wedded’ to his or her previous position as a prosecutor that the judge ‘would consciously or unconsciously avoid the
56
appearance of having erred or changed position.’” The Williams
opinion cited concepts and language from Withrow, but reached
different conclusions.
The Williams majority did not follow other parts of Withrow’s reasoning. It did not refer to or rebut Withrow’s “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators” or Withrow’s assumption that adjudicators would act with conscience, intellectual
57
discipline, and fairness. In fact, one of the most interesting things
about the use of Withrow as a precedent is that the Supreme Court
has adopted the standard of impartiality from Withrow in other cases but has jettisoned key reasons for allowing a person both to
58
charge and adjudicate.

53. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
54. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903 (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868,
872 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975))).
55. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 57.
56. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 57).
57. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 55. The Withrow Court showed its faith in the board members at several points. It referred to the fairness of the members, id. at 55, and to their objectivity in adjudicating after making a charging decision. The board could decide not to suspend the doctor without implicitly admitting error because the decision would probably
“reflect the benefit of a more complete view of the evidence afforded by an adversary hearing.” Id. at 57–58.
58. See, e.g., Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903; Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872. The dissents in Caperton and Williams quoted the Withrow presumption of honesty and integrity in adjudicators.
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
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Second, both opinions featured discussions of Murchison, 59 but
they derived considerably different lessons. In Murchison, a state
judge heard testimony about potential crimes, charged witnesses
with perjury or contempt, and then tried and convicted them. It
was important precedent in both Withrow and Williams because
Murchison required disqualification for a decision maker’s earlier
participation in a case rather than for the traditional reason of the
adjudicator’s financial interest. Withrow emphasized the part of
Murchison that found that the judge likely relied on his own personal knowledge and impression of what the witnesses said in the
grand jury room, an impression that could not be tested by adequate cross-examination. Murchison did not “stand for the broad
rule that the members of an administrative agency may not investigate the facts, institute proceedings, and then make the necessary
60
adjudications.”
61
Withrow referred to FTC v. Cement Institute and other examples
of a decision maker exposed to the same facts for different pur62
poses. It stated that Murchison did not purport to question Cement
63
Institute and concluded that “mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself
to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary
64
hearing.”
To the Williams Court, Murchison laid down a broader rule. The
Court had overturned the convictions in Murchison because “the
judge’s dual position as accuser and decisionmaker in the contempt trials violated due process: ‘Having been a part of [the accusatory] process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things,
wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those ac65
cused.’” The Williams Court also drew on Murchison’s concern
with exposure to factual information, as discussed below, but the
59. Caperton also included an extended discussion of In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133
(1955). 556 U.S. at 880–81.
60. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 53.
61. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
62. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47–49.
63. Id. at 53.
64. Id. at 55. A year after Withrow, the Supreme Court used similar reasoning to reject a
due process challenge to a school board decision to fire striking teachers when the board
was the bargaining agent for the school district and engaged in negotiations with representatives of the striking teachers. The Court said that mere familiarity with the facts of a case
gained by an agency in performance of its statutory role does not disqualify a decision maker. Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 493–94
(1976).
65. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1906 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955)).

FALL 2018]

Accusers as Adjudicators

119

chief lesson the Court drew from Murchison was an objection to an
adjudicator’s participation in the accusatory process.
The Williams Court had the better reading of Murchison. The
first reason Murchison gave for faulting trial by the judge-grand jury
was the judge’s role in the accusatory process:
It would be very strange if our system of law permitted a
judge to act as a grand jury and then try the very persons
accused as a result of his investigations. . . . A single “judgegrand jury” is even more a part of the accusatory process
than an ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of
that process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things,
wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those
accused. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a
prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have
66
none of that zeal.
The Williams Court then expanded the part of Murchison that relied on the judge’s personal knowledge of the events to be tried rather than the evidence presented at the contempt trial. The Murchison concern had been narrow and limited to what took place
before the judge in the secret grand jury sessions. For the Murchison Court, the judge was to be impartial and weigh only the evidence presented at the contempt trial but would not be able to disregard the events at the grand jury stage and would not be subject
to cross-examination on those impressions. Williams enlarged this
concern about access to facts and opined that a judge’s personal
knowledge and impression of a case acquired through participation in a prosecution could carry more weight with the judge than
67
the parties’ arguments to the court. This was an expansion of the
point in Murchison because Williams reasoned that a prosecutor
would ascribe undue weight to all information learned while working on a case. The broader concern in Williams about information
acquired while working on a case as a prosecutor contrasts with the
statement in Withrow that “exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn
68
the fairness of [adjudicators] at a later adversary hearing.”
Third, the two opinions differed in assessing the significance of
a decision maker’s actions before the adjudication stage. Withrow
66.
67.
68.

Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906.
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55.
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gave credence to the different legal standards applicable to different stages of a matter and the ability of a decision maker to remain
analytically pure in applying those standards. “When the Board instituted its investigative procedures, it stated only that it would investigate whether proscribed conduct had occurred. Later in noticing the adversary hearing, it asserted only that it would determine
if violations had been committed which would warrant suspension
69
of appellee’s license.” In another part of the opinion, the Court
observed that judges usually participate in different stages of a proceeding, such as approving an arrest warrant and later presiding
over the criminal trial or resolving a preliminary injunction application and later presiding over permanent injunction proceed70
ings. The Court remarked that, “just as there is no logical inconsistency between a finding of probable cause and an acquittal in a
criminal proceeding, there is no incompatibility between the agency filing a complaint based on probable cause and a subsequent
decision, when all the evidence is in, that there has been no viola71
tion of the statute.”
The problem with all of the Court’s analogies in Withrow was that
none of them included a judge in the role of advocate or prosecutor with a will to win. In each example, the judge acted as a referee
who tested whether one party, as advocate, satisfied a legal standard used in an early part of a case and then applied a different legal standard to the evidence and legal arguments of the parties at a
later stage of the case. The judge was not an accuser, movant, or
72
proponent for an outcome. A later part of this Article discusses
whether a member of a charging administrative agency takes on
73
the mantle of an accuser and advocate.
Williams on the other hand worried more about the reality of
human behavior when an adjudicator, as an advocate, had played
74
an important role in a “critical” or “major adversary decision.”
Significant, personal involvement in any critical prosecutorial decision was not eradicable and was sufficient to call for the protec-

69. Id. at 54.
70. Id. at 56–57.
71. Id. at 57.
72. The Federal Circuit relied on this difference in finding that no due process problem existed with the same panel of the Patent Trials and Appeals Board first deciding to institute inter partes review and then later deciding the merits of the inter partes review. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
73. See infra Part III.B.
74. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1906 (2016).

FALL 2018]

Accusers as Adjudicators

121

tions of the Due Process Clause against a decision maker’s bias and
prejudgment. The Court explained:
Even if decades intervene before the former prosecutor revisits the matter as a jurist, the case may implicate the effects
and continuing force of his or her original decision. In
these circumstances, there remains a serious risk that a
judge would be influenced by an improper, if inadvertent,
motive to validate and preserve the result obtained through
75
the adversary process.
The Williams Court took a broad view of major adversary decisions: “A prosecutor may bear responsibility for any number of critical decisions, including what charges to bring, whether to extend
76
a plea bargain, and which witnesses to call.” Brief administrative
77
or ministerial acts do not qualify.
Williams did not draw nice differences between legal standards
or stages of a proceeding, although it could have. Using the reasoning of Withrow, the Williams Court could have argued that the
state chief justice’s actions as district attorney did not amount to
adopting the view that the defendant had committed an offense
worthy of the death penalty. Instead, it could have determined that
the district attorney did nothing more than conclude that the state,
in the particular circumstances and based on the information at
the time, had sufficient grounds and evidence to seek to persuade
the final decision maker, the jury, to impose the death penalty.
The Williams Court also could have relied on the difference between a decision to seek the death penalty at the original trial and
the standards for granting post-conviction relief. It did not rely on
these differences.
The Withrow decision does not hold up under the Williams
standard. The Board in Withrow had significant personal involvement in key prosecutorial decisions. It conducted an investigation
and then proposed to hold a contested hearing to determine
whether to suspend the doctor’s medical license. The Board later
confirmed its commitment to the view that the doctor engaged in
misconduct when it issued a decision that it had probable cause for
an action to revoke the doctor’s medical license and filed its decision with the local district attorney. The Board decided whether to
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1907.
Id.
Id.
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bring charges and what charges to bring. Before transferring responsibility to the district attorney, the Board was the proponent
and movant against the doctor. It was not a referee intermediating
between two other adversarial parties.
A fourth comparison between Withrow and Williams involves the
relevance of a decision-making body with several members. Withrow
did not comment on the number of members of the Board because it was not relevant. The doctor’s complaint applied to the
Board as a whole and did not turn on any distinction between one
member and another. All we know from Withrow is that the Board
78
had more than one member. As far as we can tell, every member
of the Board participated in every stage of the proceeding against
the doctor. By contrast, the issue of a group decision maker was
present in Williams because the state chief justice was the only
member of the court who had participated earlier in the case and
his vote in the state supreme court had not been decisive. As de79
scribed above, the Court held that an unconstitutional failure to
recuse is a structural error even if the judge in question did not
cast a deciding vote. The chief justice’s participation in the state
supreme court decision was an error that affected the “whole adju80
dicatory framework below.”
Fifth, Williams and Withrow together highlight the difference between a due process disqualification of an individual decision maker for partiality or bias on particular facts and a broader separation
of powers or due process challenge to the combination of functions within a single administrative agency. That is an important
distinction to keep in mind.
The larger separation of powers or due process question was not
at stake in Williams. Williams was about the propriety of one decision maker’s participation in one particular case because the individual had participated in the prosecution of the same case before
becoming a judge. Williams did not say that no district attorney
could become a judge. Other due process cases on partiality or bias
were also aimed at a single individual and the specific circumstances of that individual’s participation in a case or in a recurring

78. The Court referred to the “practicing physicians” on the Board and the “individual
members” of the Board. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 37–38 (1975). Section 15.405(7) of
the 1973 Wisconsin statutory code provided for eight members at the time of the doctor’s
hearings in mid-1973. See 1973 Assembly Bill 300, ch. 90, § 18, 1973 Wis. Sess. Laws 200.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 42–50.
80. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910.
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category of cases. Caperton, Murchison, and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania81
are examples.
A separation of functions challenge to an agency’s structure
would argue that the design of the Constitution, which separated
executive, judicial, and legislative powers, prohibited an Executive
Branch agency from exercising both executive and judicial functions and therefore prohibited an agency from charging and adjudicating. That would be a constitutional challenge to the powers
Congress conferred on the agency rather than a fact-specific claim
that an agency decision maker had a financial interest in an outcome or prejudice against a party. A structural due process argument of bias would rest on some of the reasons for separating executive and judicial functions. A defendant could argue that an
agency head had a bias in favor of his or her own agency and was
partial to upholding charges brought by the agency even if the
agency head did not participate in the charging decision. The Supreme Court saw a due process defect in a similar situation, when a
village mayor sat as a judge in traffic cases and the village received
a portion of the fine income from the mayor’s court even though
82
the mayor did not personally receive a share of the fines.
Withrow blended consideration of individualized due process arguments and separation of functions issues. The doctor in Withrow
asserted a due process claim, and the Supreme Court treated the
case as a due process case, but the reasoning of the opinion mixed
due process issues such as impartiality, bias, and prejudice with a
defense of the combination of functions in agencies. The Court
discussed bias cases and decisions considering an agency’s exposure to facts that later were the subject of an adjudication but concluded that those cases did not “stand for the broad rule that the
members of an administrative agency may not investigate the facts,
institute proceedings, and then make the necessary adjudica83
tions.” A pragmatic factor was that legislatures needed to be able
to combine functions within a single agency because of the complexity of the structure of government.
Lower courts and commentators have generally treated Withrow
as authority to reject separation of powers and due process attacks
on the combination of functions in federal agencies. For example,

81. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (holding that a defendant in
criminal contempt proceedings should be tried by “a judge other than the one reviled by
the contemnor”).
82. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
83. Withrow, 421 U.S.at 53.
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the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed an SEC enforcement case
in which the defendant attacked the SEC’s combination of charging and prosecution powers with the power to adjudicate and impose sanctions. The court cited Withrow as settling the question:
The defendant “failed to heed Withrow’s message that a due process challenge directed broadly to combinations of purposes or
functions in the modern administrative state ‘assumes too
84
much.’” A leading casebook also viewed Withrow as protecting
administrative agencies from separation of functions challenges:
“No one doubts . . . that a broad-based separation-of-powers challenge to the modern combination of functions in federal agencies
would meet the same fate as the broad-based due process chal85
lenge in Withrow.”
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the combination
of charging and adjudicating authority within a federal agency
contravenes separation of powers requirements, probably because
Withrow is viewed as resolving it, but separation of powers concerns
86
with agencies occasionally surface at the Court. Rumblings from
various justices signal that they might be ready to consider whether
particular combinations of functions at administrative agencies ex87
ceed separation of powers limitations.

84. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1104-07 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Another
example was Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, which involved a due process challenge
to the use of one panel of the Patent Trials and Appeals Board to institute a type of review of
claims and then make final decisions. 812 F.3d 1023, 1029–31 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The court
did not accept the due process contention largely because of Withrow. Id. at 1029 (“The leading case involving due process and the combination of functions is the Supreme Court’s decision in Withrow.”).
85. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 298 (7th ed. 2016); see also STEPHEN
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 762 (7th ed. 2011) (In
Withrow, “the Supreme Court made clear that at the agency-head level the combination of
adjudicative and investigative functions does not in itself violate due process.”).
86. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018)
(holding that the inter partes review process at the Patent and Trademark Office does not
violate Article III of the Constitution); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (holding
that bankruptcy court exercised judicial power reserved to Article III courts and stating that
the Court could not “compromise the integrity of the system of separated powers” even if
the compromise would be minor).
87. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237–38 (2015)
(Alito, J., concurring) (discussing separation of powers issues raised by Amtrak statute); id.
at 1240–42, 1246, 1250–52 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the same); Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015), (Alito, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (expressing concern about the power of administrative agencies when issuing interpretations of regulations and concern about transfer of judicial power to an executive agency); id. at 1215–20 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing similar concerns);
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); City of Arlington v.
FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877–79 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing agencies and
the separation of powers and stating “the danger posed by the growing power of the admin-
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II. WILLIAMS APPLIES TO FEDERAL AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
ADJUDICATIONS
Williams and Withrow addressed similar concerns, started their
opinions with similar legal standards, but then reached different
outcomes. As the foregoing comments explained, the reasoning of
Williams repudiated substantial segments of Withrow. Would the
Williams Court have decided Withrow differently, or does a principled, legal distinction exist between the Williams decision and administrative agency adjudications? Does Williams likely apply to
administrative agencies? Does it require agency heads who participate in accusatory functions, such as commencing proceedings asserting violations of law, to disqualify themselves when the case returns to them for final adjudications on the merits?
The factual contexts of Withrow and Williams were different, and
an important body of law cautions that due process for a court is
different from due process for an administrative agency. This Part
considers the possible ways to distinguish the two decisions. It concludes that Williams reflects an evolving concern with the likelihood of partiality that grows out of service as an advocate, that the
principles in Williams and other due process cases that address the
need for impartial decision makers apply to administrative agencies, and that pragmatic considerations favoring the combination
of charging and adjudicating functions in an agency should and
can give way to the application of Williams. This Part also reviews
empirical research that supports the Supreme Court’s concerns in
Williams.
A. Factual Differences Between Withrow and Williams
First, consider some of the obvious factual differences between
Withrow and Williams: Williams was about a judge in a criminal case
addressing the death penalty and collateral relief in state court.
Withrow was a proceeding by a state administrative agency to sus-

istrative state cannot be dismissed”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (discussing Supreme Court decisions that “permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and
concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the
Constitution of the framers’ design”).
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pend a medical license. 88 These differences are not sufficient to
lessen the legal weight Williams should carry in the agency process.
The reasoning of Williams did not depend on any of these factual distinctions. The rationale of the decision was sweeping and was
not limited to judges, criminal cases, or death penalty cases. The
Court could have reasoned that death penalty cases are different
and require special procedural protections. The defendant had
89
made that argument, but the Court did not adopt it. A decision to
seek the death penalty is consequential and was certainly a critical
90
decision in the defendant’s case, but the Court cited many other
litigation decisions as significant. The Court expanded the category of accusatory acts that would disqualify an advocate turned decision maker to include “what charges to bring, whether to extend a
91
plea bargain, and which witnesses to call.” Helping to decide what
charges to bring or which witnesses to call is a part of civil cases
and non-capital criminal cases.
The Court could have stated that criminal cases call for more restrictive judicial disqualification standards than civil or administrative cases, but the Court did not draw that distinction. To the contrary, it extracted and applied “constitutional principles” from its
“due process precedents” and reasoned that “the principles on
which these precedents rest dictate the rule that must control”
92
when a judge had prior involvement in a case as a prosecutor.
The main principle from its precedents extended well beyond
criminal cases, judges, and prosecutors: “Of particular relevance to
the instant case, the Court has determined that an unconstitution-

88. The state-federal distinction has not been significant for purposes of determining
the procedures that must be used in agency adjudications. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 199 U.S. 401, 410 (1905) (“While we need not affirm that in no instance could a distinction be taken, ordinarily if an Act of Congress is valid under the Fifth Amendment it
would be hard to say that a state law in like terms was void under the Fourteenth.”). The
Court has interpreted the procedural due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to provide similar protections in administrative adjudications, subject to exceptions, such as the debate about the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the application of the Due Process Clause
to certain issues in state criminal cases (but not to questions about the impartiality of a
judge). See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 442–46 (1992); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). See also PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 545–46 (12th ed. 2018); LAWSON, supra note 85, at 845.
89. Brief for Petitioner at 20–21, 25, 30, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899
(2016), (No. 15-5040), 2015 WL 10356400.
90. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1907 (“[W]hether to ask a jury to end the defendant’s life is
one of the most serious discretionary decisions a prosecutor can be called upon to make.”).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1905–06.
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al potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both ac93
cuser and adjudicator in a case.”
The impartiality principle applied to the larger, less specific categories of accusers and adjudicators. The Williams Court often re94
ferred to the role of a judge, jurist, or prosecutor, because those
were the facts of the case, but also broadened the analysis to “advocate,” “accuser and decisionmaker,” “fair adjudication,” and “accu95
satory process.”
The Williams rationale cannot be limited to criminal cases or judicial disqualification cases. Although criminal sanctions are severe, many agency law enforcement proceedings are nearly as se96
vere as criminal cases, as discussed below. Moreover, the function
of an agency decision maker in an enforcement adjudication is the
same as a judge’s function in a civil or criminal case. No principled
ground exists for distinguishing agency enforcement proceedings
from criminal or judicial proceedings on the issue of impartiality.
The concern is with bias, the partiality of the decision maker, and
the potential effect on the accuracy, legitimacy, and fairness of a
judicial-like decision. The need for neutrality and the appearance
of neutrality reaches many different types of proceedings:
An insistence on the appearance of neutrality is not some
artificial attempt to mask imperfection in the judicial process, but rather an essential means of ensuring the reality of
a fair adjudication. Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judi97
cial pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself.
Second, the rule in Williams might not apply to administrative
agencies because the Court did not suggest that possibility. Williams
was not a case about the combination of functions by the head of
an administrative agency. The briefs of the parties did not identify
the possibility of applying a principle of impartiality to heads of
98
administrative agencies, and none of the majority or dissenting

93. Id. at 1905.
94. Id. (referring in the holding to a judge and prosecutor); id. at 1906–10.
95. Id. at 1906, 1909.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 126–35.
97. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1909.
98. The brief for the defendant Williams cited cases involving the SEC, Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on the question of the
effect of the bias of one member of a tribunal with several members. Brief for Petitioner at
42, Williams, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No. 15-5040), 2015 WL 10356400.
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opinions remarked about the possibility of extending the result in
Williams to agencies. The Court did not address the effect on federal agencies or attempt to reconcile its principle with Withrow as a
longstanding precedent on the combination of executive and judicial roles at an agency. Surely, the Court would have said something if it meant to overturn forty years of settled practice at federal agencies.
These arguments have force but in the end are not sufficient to
protect administrative agency members acting as adjudicators from
the due process standard of impartiality developed in Williams.
Much of the language in Williams naturally was directed at a prosecutor who became a judge, because that was the situation in the
case, but the reasoning of the majority opinion was not confined to
judicial disqualifications or criminal cases and was expressed as a
constitutional due process principle. As discussed at greater length
in a moment, the Supreme Court has applied the same due process standard of impartiality to adjudicators in executive agencies
as it has to judges and criminal cases, with the exception of
Withrow. The impartiality rule in Williams also is likely to extend to
administrative agency adjudications.
Finally, the Williams Court was certainly aware of the chance that
its conclusion would be read to apply to administrative agencies.
Withrow is the standard authority for the proposition that an administrative agency may investigate, charge, and adjudicate; the
majority opinion in Williams cited Withrow three times, and the
99
Chief Justice’s dissent cited Withrow once. None of the writers
cautioned that the Williams outcome did not apply to agencies.
B. Due Process, Administrative Agencies, and
Impartiality in Agency Adjudications
This section of the Article considers the different strands of due
process authorities. One important line of Supreme Court decisions supports the view that administrative agencies are different
from courts for purposes of the Due Process Clause, and those cases might be used to reason that Williams does not apply to administrative agencies. The more relevant due process authorities are the
decisions on the impartiality of an adjudicator, and those cases do

99. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903, 1906, 1909 (Kennedy, J.); id. at 1910 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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not distinguish between court and agency decision makers or administrative enforcement and criminal prosecutions.
100
Well-known cases, such as Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. El101
dridge, considered whether an evidentiary hearing was required
before or after an agency deprived a person of some type of liberty
or property interest and whether the hearing needed to approxi102
mate a judicial trial. The Court stressed that due process was not
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place, and circumstance and, instead, was flexible and dependent
103
on the demands of the particular situation. It developed the now
104
famous and frequently invoked three-factor balancing test. “Under the Mathews balancing test, a court evaluates (A) the private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental
105
interest at stake.” In many situations, the test does not call for all
106
the protections of court litigation.
The due process precedents more relevant to the question of an
agency head who participates in authorizing an enforcement proceeding and later participates in resolving the merits of the claim
are those addressing the neutrality and impartiality of the decision
maker in an adjudication. Williams, Withrow, Murchison, and other
decisions fall into this subcategory.
The remainder of this section demonstrates that the due process
cases on impartiality apply equally to administrative agency adjudicators and judges and favor application of Williams to agency enforcement proceedings. The differences between courts and agencies, as well as the differences among civil, criminal, and
administrative proceedings, have not mattered when considering
the standards for the neutrality or impartiality of the decision
maker, and the demands of the modern administrative state have
100. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
101. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
102. Id. at 333–34.
103. Id. at 334.
104. Id. at 335. The Court applies the test in a variety of situations, especially to determine the process due in administrative cases. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
528–29 (2004); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 580–
629 (12th ed. 2018).
105. Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017).
106. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (“The ultimate balance involves a determination as
to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must be imposed upon
administrative action to assure fairness . . . . [D]ifferences in the origin and function of administrative agencies ‘preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial,
and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.’”) (quoting
FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
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not diluted those standards. This uniform application reflects the
high level of due process protection accorded to the impartiality of
adjudicatory decision makers. That high value deserves to be protected in agency enforcement cases because agency adjudicators
perform the same function as a judge and the stakes for the defendant can be very high.
The Supreme Court has applied its decisions on the impartiality
of judges and agency officials interchangeably. It has cited judicial
disqualification decisions in cases about agency officials and vice
versa. The legal standard did not vary depending on whether the
decision maker was a judge or an agency official, and the reasoning was not moderated with balancing factors or cost-benefit tests.
In Schweiker v. McClure, the Court considered the impartiality of
Medicare hearing officers appointed by private insurance carriers
and cited Murchison, a decision about judges, as one of the cases
107
establishing the relevant standards. In Gibson v. Berryhill, which
concerned an administrative board of optometrists, the Court noted the “prevailing view that ‘[m]ost of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to . . . adminis108
trative adjudicators.’”
The Court also has applied impartiality principles from administrative situations to judicial disqualification cases. Williams itself is
an example. It was a judicial disqualification case, but it extracted
key principles for its analysis from Withrow and discussed Tumey v.
Ohio, which was a case about an executive official acting in a judi109
cial capacity. Caperton, another judicial disqualification case, cited
Withrow for the constitutional standard for recusal (recusal is necessary when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable”) and
reviewed the main due process cases requiring recusal, including
several that involved executive officials: Tumey, Gibson, and Ward v.
110
111
Village of Monroeville, another case about a mayor’s court.
112
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. explained that the cases on neutrality
and impartiality apply to a person serving in an adjudicatory role,
whether in a court or an agency, and do not apply to agency offi-

107. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196 (1982).
108. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578–79 (1973) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT [sic] § 12.04, at 250 (1972) (concerning bias by prejudgment
and pecuniary interest)).
109. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
110. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
111. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876–79 (2009).
112. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
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cials not acting in a judicial role. The case was a due process challenge to an administrator’s actions within an area of the Department of Labor that determined certain violations and assessed
penalties. Penalty payments were paid to the administrator’s area
of the Department, creating, in the view of the challenging party,
an impermissible risk that the administrator would be biased to
113
make more and larger penalty assessments. The Court discussed
the due process requirement of neutrality from Tumey and Ward,
observing that it had “employed the same principle in a variety of
settings, demonstrating the powerful and independent constitutional interest in fair adjudicative procedure” and citing a mix of
114
judge, justice of the peace, and agency cases. In the end, the
Court decided that the impartiality rules did not apply because the
administrator was not acting in a judicial capacity. “The rigid requirements of Tumey and Ward, designed for officials performing
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, are not applicable to those act115
ing in a prosecutorial or plaintiff-like capacity.”
Similar examination of Supreme Court precedents demonstrates
the Court applies the impartiality principles uniformly to criminal,
civil, and administrative cases. The Court has not developed a special, stricter impartiality rule for criminal cases. The Court’s 2009
Caperton decision is illustrative. Caperton concerned judicial disqualification in a civil tort case for compensatory and punitive damages, but the Court invoked due process impartiality principles from
several criminal cases, including Murchison, Tumey, Ward, and May116
berry. The Court applied all or some of those same criminal precedents in cases about the impartiality of administrative actors, such
as Marshall and Gibson. The reasoning of Williams is therefore apt
to extend to administrative enforcement adjudications even
though Williams was a criminal case.
Applying the standards of judicial neutrality to an agency official
engaged in a judicial function is consistent with the high level of
due process importance assigned to the impartiality of an adjudicator, whether in an agency or a federal court. Without evident disagreement or qualification, legal authorities view an impartial decision maker as a fundamental attribute of due process. In Goldberg v.
Kelly, the Court found that the government must provide some
procedural protections before terminating a person’s welfare ben113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 241.
Id. at 242–43, 243 n.2.
Id. at 248.
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872, 876–78, 880–81.
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efits. 117 A pre-termination hearing did not need to take the form of
a judicial or quasi-judicial trial, but it had to provide “minimum
118
procedural safeguards” and meet “rudimentary due process.”
The Court concluded its list of necessary procedures with this:
119
“And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.” An
impartial decision maker was a minimum procedural safeguard of
rudimentary due process.
Commentators agree. One treatise writer said: “Due process requires a neutral, or unbiased, adjudicatory decisionmaker. Scholars
and judges consistently characterize provision of a neutral decisionmaker as one of the three or four core requirements of a sys120
tem of fair adjudicatory decisionmaking.” Another scholar concluded that an agency decision maker “should not be biased for or
against any party. An impartial decisionmaker is an essential element of an evidentiary hearing. Impartiality is required both by the
121
APA and by due process.” In a widely cited article, Judge Henry
Friendly put “an unbiased tribunal” at the top of his list of the ele122
ments of a fair hearing.
Even Withrow accepted the need for a fair tribunal in an administrative adjudication, although the result did not fulfill the promise of the principle. Withrow conceded (that was the word the Court
used) that a basic requirement of due process was a fair trial in a
fair tribunal and then immediately said: “This applies to adminis123
trative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts.”
Certainly the purpose of requiring an impartial decision maker
is the same in both courts and administrative proceedings. The
judge and the agency adjudicator perform the same function in
the type of administrative law enforcement proceeding addressed
here. They take or review evidence about specific historical facts
involving a particular person, receive arguments about the proper
legal standard of behavior, apply the law to the facts to determine
whether the person committed a violation of law, and then impose
a sanction or relief for a violation. The reason to have a neutral

117. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
118. Id. at 265–67.
119. Id. at 271 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)).
120. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.8 (5th ed. 2010).
121. Asimow, Evidentiary Hearings, supra note 10, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
122. Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975); see
also Redish & McCall, supra note 6, at 2, 8, 12, 19 (“Of all the procedural requirements dictated by the demands of fair procedure, far and away the most important is the requirement
of an independent, neutral adjudicator.”).
123. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975).
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decision maker is to maximize the chance of a result on the merits
of the relevant facts and law and to minimize the chance that external influences distort an objective determination of the facts
124
and application of the law. A famous passage in Tumey described
the impartiality standard this way:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him
not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the
State and the accused, denies the latter due process of
125
law.
The same demands for accuracy and legitimacy in the eyes of the
defendant and the public are present whether a judge or an agency head decides that a defendant did or did not break the law.
A further consideration in assessing whether to apply the standards of judicial neutrality to an agency adjudicator, at least in government enforcement cases, is that just as much or more is at stake
in an administrative enforcement proceeding as a case in federal
court and nearly as much is at stake as in a criminal case. Different
agencies have different powers, but many agency enforcement cas-

124.

The Court gave these reasons for the neutrality requirement:

This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two
central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected
individuals in the decisionmaking process. . . . The neutrality requirement helps
to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. . . . At the same time, it
preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, “generating the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done,” Joint Anti-Fascist
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), by
ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not
predisposed to find against him.
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Williams v.
Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1907, 1909 (2016) (“Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to
the rule of law itself.”); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (“If the
judge discovers that some personal bias or improper consideration seems to be the actuating cause of the decision or to be an influence so difficult to dispel that there is a real possibility of undermining neutrality, the judge may think it necessary to consider withdrawing
from the case.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (“[P]rocedural due process
rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the
generality of cases.”).
125. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
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es resemble criminal prosecutions. SEC enforcement cases do, and
they do so whether they are brought as administrative proceedings
or district court actions. Violations carry moral opprobrium and
126
social stigma and can result in a wide array of severe sanctions
and forms of relief. In an administrative proceeding, the SEC may
127
levy a fine, order disgorgement of large amounts of money plus
128
129
prejudgment interest, issue a cease and desist order, and prohibit a person from being an officer or director of a publicly re130
porting company. The SEC may suspend or revoke the registration of a regulated person such as a broker-dealer or investment
131
adviser. It may deny a lawyer or accountant the ability to practice
132
and represent clients before the SEC. The main forms of relief in
an SEC enforcement case in federal court are the same, with the
exception of the SEC’s power over regulated persons and profes133
sionals practicing before the SEC. A defendant in an SEC enforcement case does not face jail or the death penalty, but otherwise faces serious consequences. The SEC has the power and uses
134
that power to ruin reputations, livelihoods, and businesses. The

126. See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 451–52 (2013) (stating that monetary penalties in
SEC enforcement cases are intended to punish and label defendants as wrongdoers); SEC v.
Bartek, 484 F. App’x 949, 957 (5th Cir. 2012) (injunction and director and officer bar
“would have a stigmatizing effect and long-lasting repercussions”); Securities Law Enforcement
in the Current Financial Crisis Before the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony by Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/
ts032009ebw.htm (bar on appearing or practicing before the SEC “carries a serious reputational stigma”); Thomas O. Gorman, The SEC, Insider Trading and Prosecutorial Obligations,
SEC ACTIONS (Apr. 23, 2017), http://www.secactions.com/the-sec-insider-trading-andprosecutorial-obligations/ (“Charging someone with violations of the law carries a stigma
which last [sic] long after the case is dismissed; prosecuting that case through trial only increases that harm, grinding the stain and injury into the reputational fabric of the person
prosecuted.”).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a) (2012).
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 201.600(a) (2018).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2012).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f) (2012).
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4), (b)(6), 80b-3(e)–(f). License revocation proceedings
ranked high on Judge Friendly’s list of most serious government actions against a person. See
Friendly, supra note 122, at 1297.
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2018).
133. In federal court, the SEC may seek and the court may order an injunction, a civil
monetary penalty, disgorgement with pre-judgment interest, and other equitable relief. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1)–(3), (5) (2012). In Kokesh v. SEC, the Court did not express an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings. 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 n.3 (2017).
134. KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 5, 135
(1997) (noting that “the publicity that frequently accompanies enforcement actions can be
devastating to those who depend on investor confidence for their business” and an administrative order “may have a business or career-ending impact on firms or persons in the securities business”).
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severity of the results of government enforcement cases brought as
administrative proceedings rebuts the idea that, because less is at
stake in administrative cases than in criminal cases, the due process
135
protections may be relaxed.
The Supreme Court’s decisions on the due process requirement
of impartiality apply equally to judicial or administrative decision
makers and to criminal and agency enforcement proceedings. The
standard is a high one, and, aside from Withrow, has not been watered down with considerations of costs, burdens, or the need for
procedural flexibility in agency cases. An agency head deciding the
merits of an enforcement case performs the same function as a
judge, and a defendant has much at stake in an administrative enforcement case. The grounds for relaxing the standard of impartiality for an agency adjudicator in an enforcement case are extremely weak. The next section of the Article reviews research
showing that the Williams Court was correct to be concerned about
the likelihood that an accuser maintains a bias against the accused.
C. Data Supporting Bias in Accusers
Several sources support the Williams Court view that a charging
official likely develops a will to win or a stake in sustaining the
charges. Three are empirical studies, and one reports the personal
experience of an SEC Commissioner. None is definitive, but they
are consistent with the position that an accuser lacks the necessary
neutrality to determine the merits of the initial charging decision.
The first set of data reports results of SEC adjudications that reviewed ALJ decisions in cases where the Commission charged one
or more violations of the securities laws. The Commission reviewed
ALJ decisions covering sixty-four defendants in administrative enforcement proceedings that the Commission began in fiscal years
2007 through 2015. For sixty of the sixty-four defendants, over
ninety-three percent, the Commission found one or more violations and ordered a sanction. The Commissioners dismissed all
charges against four of the sixty-four defendants. For seven of the
sixty defendants found liable, nearly twelve percent, the ALJ had
dismissed all charges, but the Commission disagreed with the ALJ

135. Contrary to this last statement, one commentator reasoned that the combination of
prosecution and adjudication in one agency does not need to comply with the stringent requirements of the criminal model because an agency does not have the power to order incarceration. See 2 PIERCE, supra note 120, § 9.9, at 884.

136

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 52:1

and found violations. 136 Thus, when the SEC judged cases in which
it had brought charges, it won against over ninety-three percent of
defendants. In contested cases in federal court, the SEC’s success
137
rate was much worse; it prevailed eighty percent of the time.
Achieving a more favorable outcome for the SEC in thirteen percent of cases appears to be meaningful in a system in which the
SEC staff conducts lengthy one-sided investigations and the Commissioners have complete discretion in charging decisions.
A different research project looked at potential bias at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in merger challenges decided be138
tween 1956 and 1992. The charging process at the FTC is similar
to the one at the SEC. The Commissioners vote on administrative
complaints, send the matter to an ALJ for an initial decision, and
then review ALJ decisions. An “FTC commissioner can act as both
139
the prosecutor and the judge on a particular case.” The authors
found that FTC “commissioners are more likely to vote for administrative complaints if they were members of the commission that
chose to prosecute those cases. Thus, it appears to matter if com140
missioners act as both prosecutors and judges.” The “ability of
commissioners to act as both prosecutor and judge in a particular
matter can significantly increase the likelihood of a merger or141
der.” An analysis of the combination of prosecution and adjudication functions at the FTC and NLRB by Richard Posner published in 1972 differed, concluding that the results, “although
hardly definitive,” suggested that the combination did not bias an
142
agency’s adjudication.

136. An SEC fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30; for example, fiscal
year 2015 ended on September 30, 2015.
I am grateful to Urska Velikonja for these details from data she compiled. For a description of her data on SEC enforcement cases, see Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315 (2017).
The figures in the text about Commission review of ALJ initial decisions cover cases in
which the Commission issued an opinion by June 30, 2017. The enforcement cases were
primary enforcement actions, not follow-on proceedings, as Professor Velikonja defines
them. A primary enforcement action is one to establish a violation of the securities laws and
obtain relief. A follow-on case is an administrative proceeding for additional regulatory or
disciplinary relief based on success in a preceding primary action. Id. at 338–39.
137. Id. at 349, 352 (explaining inclusion of some voluntary dismissals).
138. Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Does it Matter that the Prosecutor Is also the Judge?
The Administrative Complaint Process at the Federal Trade Commission, 19 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 1, 3 (1998).
139. Id. at 2.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305, 343
(1972); see BREYER, supra note 85, at 764–65.
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A third study concerned lawyers rather than agencies and considered whether lawyers tend to view the merits of their clients’
cases too favorably. This research is relevant to agency adjudications because the head of an agency, when deciding that the agency should charge a person with a violation of law, is in a position
resembling a lawyer agreeing to represent a client in litigation.
143
Furthermore, in many cases, the agency head is a lawyer. This
particular study sought to avoid flaws in earlier research on lawyer
optimism bias by questioning law students about the merits of the
144
position they took in moot court competitions. One of the two
questions used to assess a person’s perceived confidence in the
merits of a legal position was: “If you were the judge, how likely
145
would you be to rule in favor” of your opponent? The data from
the study showed that “students overwhelmingly perceive that the
legal merits favor the side that they were randomly assigned to rep146
resent” and that “[p]articipation in advocacy is causally associated with increased confidence in the merits of the side that the law147
yer is advocating.”
The final source of support for the bias of agency heads who
charge and judge comes from the reflections of a former SEC
148
Commissioner. A few months after he finished six years in office,
the former Commissioner recounted the “tri-functional” responsibilities of the SEC—to formulate general policies of regulation, to
prosecute violations, and to pass on the rights and liabilities of in149
dividuals accused of violations —and concluded that the commissioners of such an agency needed to act with the “cold neutrality of
150
an impartial judge” when they acted in a judicial capacity. Unfortunately, that was not his experience. When an SEC adjudication
concerned policies of the Commission’s own making, the SEC had
a vested interest in reaching a particular result and protecting and
143. All the SEC Commissioners appointed since the Clinton Administration have been
lawyers, except for Chairman Donaldson and Commissioners Glassman and Piwowar. For
the available biographical information about each Commissioner, see SEC Historical Summary
of Chairmen and Commissioners, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/
sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
144. Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype and Should
They? A Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239 (2012).
145. Id. at 249.
146. Id. at 239.
147. Id. at 263–64.
148. Edward H. Fleischman, Toward Neutral Principles: The SEC’s Discharge of Its TriFunctional Administrative Responsibilities, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 251 (1993).
149. Id. at 252.
150. Id. at 260 (quoting Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Justice and its Place in the Legal
Order, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1390, 1409 (1955)).
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advancing the particular policies. The other functions of the
Commission detracted from the impartiality of the judicial work.
“[I]t is fairness and the appearance of fairness that are left behind
when the SEC bends its adjudicatory responsibilities to the services
151
of its policymaking function.”
D. Impartiality, Separation of Functions, and the Practical Needs of the
Administrative State
This Article has shown that the due process standard of impartiality has a high value and applies equally to agency adjudicators
and judges, who perform the same functions and have the ability
to impose similar sanctions when deciding enforcement cases. It
has also reviewed empirical support for the Supreme Court’s concerns about an accuser’s bias. Those factors weigh in favor of applying the strictures in Williams to administrative adjudications.
An additional topic to examine is the practical consideration
whether some federal agencies should allow their leaders to combine the functions of charging and adjudicating to take advantage
of expertise and operate efficiently within the modern administrative state. This section examines the practical concerns, argues that
they do not outweigh due process values, and concludes that applying Williams to agency enforcement adjudications does not need to
sacrifice expertise and efficiency.
Authorities give practical reasons for combining functions within a single agency. Agencies are essential tools in modern government, and agency heads have an informed and experienced understanding of the statutes, rules, and policies in their areas that
give them a comparative advantage when evaluating the types of
conduct that should be subject to an enforcement charge and that
should be found to be a violation. Vesting final decision-making
power in agency heads allows them to retain control over the policy direction of the agency, promote consistency in legal interpretations and adjudicatory results, and monitor the functioning of the
152
regulatory area.

151. Id. at 261.
152. See Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3, 34–37), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3129560; George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions
from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987).
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The Withrow Court reasoned that prohibiting an agency from
charging and deciding “would bring down too many procedures
designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great
153
and growing complexity.” The growth, variety, and complexity of
administrative processes gave legislators latitude to determine
when different administrative functions should be performed by
154
the same persons. “The incredible variety of administrative
mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing
155
principle.” Withrow was loath to constrain Congress’s discretion
to tailor the design of an administrative agency for the needs of
modern government.
Commentators attributed Withrow and other Supreme Court decisions on the combination of functions in an agency to similar
pragmatic factors rather than legal ones. One said the main
ground for the decisions “has been that the combination of functions is necessary to secure expert administrative decisionmaking
in a complex society.” Impartiality comes at too great a price given
156
the tradeoff with informed expertise in the administrative state.
Another writer cited the inefficiency, burden, and expense of requiring a separation of functions: Congress’s decision to allow an
agency head to investigate, charge, and adjudicate “represents a
tradeoff between the goal of minimizing the risk of potential conflicts of interest attributable to an agency head’s multiple roles and
the goal of creating an efficient decisionmaking structure. The Supreme Court has consistently acquiesced in the balance Congress
157
struck in the APA.”
The response to these pragmatic considerations has several
parts. First, the practical factors supporting the need for combined
functions in an agency are aimed more at mollifying separation of
powers and institutional due process concerns than at denying an
impartial decision maker to a defendant in an agency enforcement
case. The expertise, efficiency, and cost arguments in favor of
combining functions within a single agency relate more to the

153. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 49–50 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 410 (1971)).
154. Id. at 51.
155. Id. at 52.
156. Vermeule, supra note 6, at 405.
157. 2 PIERCE, supra note 120, at 889; see also Asimow, supra note 6, at 787–88 (“Clearly
combinations arising because a legislature gives investigating, negotiating, prosecuting, and
adjudicating tasks to a single agency, so that agency heads are ultimately responsible for all
functions, do not violate due process. A contrary holding would violate the principle of necessity and sow uncertainty and disruption in all levels of government.”).
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overall institution and the expertise and efficiency gains of permitting different staff areas to work together than to advantages that
occur from allowing the senior people in an agency to charge violations and then make final agency decisions on those charges.
The staff who regulate a particular market and write rules for it are
valuable advisers to the staff who investigate potential misconduct
and recommend enforcement cases, and the experiences of the
enforcement staff aid the regulatory areas. For example, when the
SEC proposed new regulations to govern broker-dealer recommendations about securities to retail customers, the proposal drew
heavily from the history of enforcement cases against broker158
dealers. Some expertise, policy, and consistency benefits accrue
from consolidating rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication responsibilities in the top persons in an agency, but the bulk of the
advantage is found in the overall operation of the agency. To the
extent the benefits occur at the agency-head level, they should not
be enough to defeat a due process objection based on Williams for
the additional reasons discussed below; whether the practical benefits from the combination of functions within a single agency
would be enough to defeat a separation of powers challenge is not
clear and, in any event, is beyond the scope of this article.
Second, applying the due process rule of Williams to a federal
agency would not impose a blanket prohibition on agency heads
from both charging and adjudicating. The rule from Williams
would operate on individual agency heads in a particular set of circumstances—when they participated in a significant charging decision—and not as a constitutional barrier prohibiting the combination of functions within an agency. This distinction was discussed
159
above. The main legacy of Withrow could continue. Agency heads
could continue to vote to bring an enforcement case and then later vote on its final disposition as long as the same individual did
not do both. Withrow would need to be read compatibly with Williams, but it would not need to be entirely overruled.
Third, interests in administrative expertise and efficiency should
not outweigh the due process values in a neutral and impartial decision maker. The due process requirement for a fair and impartial
decision maker has constitutional status, and it serves, to a large

158. Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,576–77 nn. 9–18 (proposed May 9,
2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 80–83.
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extent, to protect the individual from the powers of government.160
The need to use agencies to operate modern government is an interest with weight, but the combination of functions in a single
agency does not have explicit constitutional recognition, and, as
already discussed, an impartial adjudicator is at the top of the due
161
process hierarchy. As described below, an agency can likely develop reasonable alternative approaches that would allow it to provide a neutral decision maker to a person accused of a violation of
law and preserve most of the benefits of the combined functions of
charging and adjudicating.
Fourth, Williams only has bite at the agency-head level and not at
lower echelons. Section 554(d) of the APA already prohibits the
combination of prosecution and adjudication in all parts of a federal agency except for “a member or members of the body comprising the agency.” Consequently, the effect of Williams is limited
to the top officials at an agency, such as the SEC’s Commissioners.
Except for final action by agency heads to decide a contested administrative enforcement case, an agency could continue to function as it does now with no changes in staffing or procedures at
levels beneath its leaders.
Fifth, if Williams applied, agencies would have several ways they
could continue to combine enforcement and adjudication func162
tions. As discussed below, applying the Williams rule at the SEC
would not create unmanageable problems. The length of time
from the commencement of a case to the time the Commission
reaches a decision in a review of an ALJ decision is several years,
and changes in the composition of the Commission would mean
163
an untainted quorum would usually be available. If a quorum was
not available, the agency could wait until a quorum was available or
accept an ALJ’s initial decision as final.
Therefore, for the series of reasons discussed above, Williams
should apply to administrative agencies. First, a neutral or impartial adjudicator is highly valued in the due process hierarchy. It is

160. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause . . . ‘was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government . . . .’”) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884))).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 117–23 .
162. See infra Part III.C–D .
163. See infra text accompanying notes 190–93; see also Asimow, supra note 6, at 785–88
(“[A] court might conclude that a single commissioner of a multimember agency who has
previously functioned as an adversary . . . can be disqualified without undue cost and disruption . . . . [T]he costs of disqualifying a single member of a multi-member agency . . . would
generally . . . be minor.”).
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one of the three or four core requirements of a fair adjudicatory
system. Second, since Withrow, the Supreme Court has applied its
due process principles of impartiality without distinguishing between judicial and agency adjudicators or administrative and criminal cases. The decisions on the impartiality of judges apply with
full force to agency officials acting in a judicial capacity. The due
process standard of impartiality and neutrality for an adjudicator
has not been lower for an agency decision maker than for a judge.
Third, the purpose of the neutrality requirement applies to the
function of an agency adjudicator in enforcement cases. Fourth,
research supports the fear that an accuser builds a lasting will to
win against an accused. Fifth, the alarm that a federal agency could
not operate efficiently if due process disqualified an agency head
from sitting as an adjudicator when he or she participated in
launching the enforcement case is overstated and, in any event,
does not supersede the importance of preserving impartiality in adjudications decided by agency heads. These reasons strongly suggest that Williams applies to federal agency adjudications and prohibits individuals who head agencies from participating in a
decision to charge a violation of law and then in a final agency
conclusion on the charge.
III. THE APPLICATION OF WILLIAMS TO SEC ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT CASES
If the rule in Williams applies to federal agencies, it would apply
to the procedures that the SEC follows. At the SEC, Commissioners
act as both accuser and adjudicator. In this Part, we look at the
SEC’s procedures, the reasons those procedures would violate the
rule in Williams, and the way Williams would have affected three
proceedings. Because of turnover at the SEC and the SEC’s quorum rules, applying Williams would rarely disable the agency from
issuing a final adjudication on the merits of an administrative proceeding.
A. The Role of SEC Commissioners in Initiating and Resolving
Administrative Enforcement Proceedings
This section reviews the procedures the SEC follows in enforcement cases. SEC Commissioners both charge a person with a violation of law and then sit as judges to decide whether the defendant

FALL 2018]

Accusers as Adjudicators

143

committed the violation. Other agencies also involve commissioners or top officials in both the commencement and resolution of
enforcement cases. Examples of such agencies are the Federal
164
165
Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission,
166
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Ener167
gy Regulatory Commission, and the Consumer Financial Protec168
tion Bureau.
A majority of SEC Commissioners must vote to authorize an en169
forcement case. The staff of the Division of Enforcement conducts investigations and makes charging recommendations in a detailed action memorandum that reviews significant portions of the
information from the record of the investigation. The Commissioners jointly discuss and then vote on the staff’s recommenda170
tions at a closed Commission meeting. A majority of Commis-

164. LAWSON, supra note 85, at 290–91 (describing the enforcement process at FTC).
165. A person is liable for a forfeiture penalty if the FCC determines the person committed a violation of certain communications laws. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (2012). The Commission must issue a notice of apparent liability in writing to impose a forfeiture penalty on a
person. Id. § 503(b)(4)(A). The Commission then has the power to determine the forfeiture
penalty in an adjudication. Id. § 503(b)(2)(E), 503(b)(3)(A). A staff member has delegated
authority to issue the notice of apparent liability and to determine the penalty amount when
the amount does not exceed certain levels. 47 C.F.R. § 0.311(a)(4) (2018).
166. See Dan M. Berkovitz, The Resurrection of CFTC Administrative Enforcement Proceedings:
Efficient Justice or a Biased Forum?, 35 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 2, 3–6 (2015), https://
www.wilmerhale.com/-/media/ed79ca97e7f74c8ca2d205044e081332.pdf; Gideon Mark,
SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 45, 71–72 (2016).
167. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, REVISED POLICY STATEMENT ON ENFORCEMENT, 123
FERC ¶ 61,156 at ¶¶ 35–41, Pt. III.B.3. (2008), https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/commmeet/2008/051508/M-1.pdf.
168. See 12 U.S.C. § 5563(b)(1)(A), (D); PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 137–38, 154
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting); id. at 165, 171 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); CFPB, ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, 2-6, 2-8, https://
www.venable.com/files/upload/CFPB_Enforcement_Policies_and_Procedures_Manual.pdf
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
169. The main securities acts require the Commission to initiate an enforcement case.
The Exchange Act says that “the Commission” may issue a notice instituting an administrative proceeding for a cease-and-desist order and that “the Commission . . . may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u-3(a)–(b); see
also id. §§ 77h-1(a)–(b), 77t(b), 80a-9(f), 80a-41(d), 80b-3(k)(1), 80b-9(d). The Commission
has the authority to delegate its statutory power to commence an enforcement case, id. at §
78d-1(a), but has not exercised that power. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4 (indicating delegations
that have been made to the Director of Division of Enforcement); cf. SEC DIVISION OF
ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 2.5.1–2.5.2 (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (referencing requirement of Commission approval to bring suit).
170. For a description of the submission of an action memorandum to the Commissioners for approval to bring an enforcement case and of Commission deliberations on proposed enforcement cases at a closed meeting, see SEC DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 2.5 (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/
enforcementmanual.pdf; Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Opening Re-
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sioners must agree on the important decision to sue, the charges to
be asserted, and the forms of relief to be sought. For example, the
Commissioners make the final choices about whether to assert a
fraud claim and whether to seek a financial penalty or an order to
prohibit a person from being an officer or director of a public
company. Discussion among the Commissioners can lead to
171
tougher or more lenient claims or requested relief.
The Commission also decides whether to bring the case in fed172
eral district court or in the internal SEC administrative process.
An administrative case goes first to an administrative law judge for
an initial decision on whether a violation occurred and whether
sanctions are appropriate. The ALJ conducts pre-trial and trial
proceedings with adversarial parties that brief and argue legal issues, take discovery, present witnesses, and introduce evidence.
173
The ALJ holds an on-the-record, trial-type hearing, compiles a
record, and then releases a long written decision with findings of
174
fact and conclusions of law.
ALJ decisions are then subject to review by the full Commission,
which has complete authority to affirm, reverse, modify, or remand
the ALJ’s decision or make findings or conclusions based on the
175
record. In these adjudications, the Commission acts as a court.
The Commissioners receive legal briefs from the parties, hear oral
176
argument, jointly deliberate about the case at a closed meeting,
and issue a written opinion that reviews evidence of the conduct of
the defendant, applies the law to determine whether a violation
occurred, and imposes sanctions. A majority of participating
Commissioners determines the disposition of the merits of the
177
case.

marks to the Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks Series (Feb. 9, 2007), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch020907cc.htm.
171. Cf. Luis A. Aguilar, Dissenting Statement In the Matter of Lynn R. Blodgett and Kevin R.
Kyser, CPA, Respondents (Aug. 28, 2014) (criticizing the case for failing to include fraud
charges or a bar on appearing before the SEC as an accountant), www.sec.gov/News/
PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370542787855.
172. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2018).
173. See id. §§ 201.300–201.360 (2018). The SEC’s Rules of Practice govern administrative proceedings. Id. §§ 201.100–201.900.
174. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.350-60 (2018).
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a) (2018); see also Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), pet. for review denied by equally divided en banc
court, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Bandimere v. SEC, 844
F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
176. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.450–201.451 (2018).
177. 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (2018).
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B. SEC Commissioners as Accusers
The next question is whether this SEC process has features that
create an unconstitutional potential for bias faulted in the Supreme Court’s Williams decision. The better conclusion is that it
does. Commissioners have a direct, personal role in critical decisions of initiating enforcement cases by the agency they head. They
are accusers who have a desire to prevail, and they later act as
judges to decide whether the defendant committed the charged
misconduct.
The decisions that SEC Commissioners make when they vote to
approve the specific charges and the specific requested relief
against a defendant fit within the category of critical or major adversary decisions defined in Williams. The examples in Williams
178
were decisions about which charges to bring or witnesses to call.
A Commissioner votes to authorize a case, the specific charges, the
proposed sanctions, and the forum. These are among the most
consequential decisions a law enforcement agency can make. After
an initial ALJ decision, a Commissioner resolves all liability and
sanctions issues from the ALJ opinion raised by the defendant or
the Division of Enforcement. According to Williams, a person with
responsibility for a major adversary decision is likely to continue to
be influenced by a motive to validate that decision.
An SEC Commissioner might seek to avoid this criticism by
claiming that he or she applies one legal standard when deciding
whether to charge a person (such as sufficient evidence to raise a
substantial question or probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the violation) and a stricter legal standard when
voting as an adjudicator on final liability issues (such as prepon179
derance of the evidence on each aspect of the violation). The
Commissioner could say that the Commission is a neutral umpire
between the advocacy of the Enforcement staff and the arguments
of the defendant and that it therefore acts in the nature of a judge
or magistrate when deciding to bring a case. The argument would
be that the application of a higher legal standard for purposes of
determining final liability removes any taint of advocacy from participation at the charging stage. Recall that Withrow took different

178. See supra text accompanying notes 44–45, 76–77.
179. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (holding that the standard of proof in an
SEC enforcement adjudication, including one for fraud, is preponderance of the evidence).
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legal standards into account, while Williams did not mention that
factor. 180
The possible use of different legal standards at different phases
of an SEC case is not a persuasive basis for insulating an SEC
Commissioner from Williams. The question, according to Williams,
is not whether an accuser uses a different legal standard from the
181
one used to judge but whether a person becomes an accuser, advocate, or adversary with an unacceptable risk of being psychologically wedded to the position that the defendant engaged in misconduct. Williams could have drawn lines based on different legal
182
tests or standards but did not. To the Williams Court, a person
did not need much involvement in the earlier stages of an enforcement proceeding to qualify the person as an accuser or advocate. Selecting charges or witnesses was sufficient. Ancillary involvement decades earlier was sufficient. The test set a low
threshold, and, as just discussed, the role of an SEC Commissioner
easily meets it.
Even if a Commissioner employed one legal standard for a vote
to charge and a different legal standard to hold a defendant liable,
a vote to authorize an enforcement case makes the Commissioner
an accuser. The Commissioners are the leaders of the Agency that
will be named as the complaining party. The Enforcement staff
does not bring a case; the Agency does, and the Agency may not do
so unless a majority of the Commissioners votes to commence the
case. This kind of role carried weight in Williams. The Court cited
the need for the express authorization of the district attorney, who
later became a state supreme court justice, before Pennsylvania
183
could pursue the death penalty against Williams.

180. See supra text accompanying notes 69–77.
181. The statutory authority for SEC administrative cease-and-desist proceedings specifies no standard for commencing a case or resolving it. The provision states that the Commission may enter a cease-and-desist order if it “finds” that a person is violating, has violated,
or is about to violate any of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(a), 78u-3(a)
(2012). An SEC Commissioner is free to apply no standard or a personally selected standard
when commencing an enforcement case. Presumably, most Commissioners would employ a
lower legal standard to charge a violation than to determine ultimate liability. An appropriate charging standard is that the Commissioners should not authorize a proceeding unless
they believe that (1) a reasonable person would conclude that the SEC is more likely than
not to prevail on the facts and the law and (2) that a proceeding would serve broad and legitimate enforcement goals of deterrence or prevention. See Andrew N. Vollmer, Four Ways
To Improve SEC Enforcement, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 333, 341–42 (2015).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78.
183. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2016).
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The language in Williams describes an accuser as an advocate
and adversary with a desire to prevail. 184 SEC Commissioners know
that charging a person with a violation of law is a serious matter
and do not want to be wrong. A vote to charge would not be responsible if a Commissioner did not conclude that the defendant
should be the subject of an enforcement proceeding and that the
agency should win. The Commissioners know that the SEC’s enforcement record matters for deterrence, compliance in the securities markets, the SEC’s reputation, and success in obtaining con185
gressional appropriations. Losing too many enforcement cases
would harm the mission of the Agency the Commissioners are responsible for leading.
The notion that the Commissioners are passive observers, neutral intermediaries, or referees between the Enforcement staff and
the potential defendant is not sustainable. A decision to charge is
not just a comparison of information from an investigation to a legal standard. It is a policy judgment that the person deserves to be
held accountable for the conduct and that the resources of the
Agency should be used against this person rather than another
person. In a great number of cases at the charging phase, Commissioners undoubtedly conclude that the defendant committed the
violation. Whether they apply different legal standards to charge
and adjudicate, SEC Commissioners, like the judge in Murchison,
become the accuser and an advocate for the position that the de186
fendant committed the violation.
The information provided to a Commissioner at the time of voting to begin an enforcement case creates the further risk, identified in Williams, that the adjudicator’s personal knowledge and impressions of the case could carry more weight than the parties’
187
arguments at the final adjudication. An SEC Commissioner receives a material amount of information about the staff’s investigation of the facts in the action memorandum before a decision to

184. Id. at 1906 (referring to an “advocate,” “adversary decision,” “interest in the outcome,” and desire to avoid appearing to change position).
185. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 906–12, 918, 920–21 (2016).
186. See Redish & McCall, supra note 6, at 25, 27 (“[T]he commissioners’ position as
heads of their agency automatically places them in a partisan role inconsistent with the impartiality by which they are constitutionally bound”; as in Murchison, “the commissioners may
be predisposed to believe the parties charged are guilty because they initially viewed the evidence through a prosecutorial or adversarial lens.”).
187. See Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906.
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charge. This information will not necessarily become part of the
188
record before the Commission at the time of a final disposition.
Under the Supreme Court’s rationale in Williams, due process
forbids an SEC Commissioner who votes on commencing a particular enforcement case from participating in final agency action in
that case to determine a defendant’s liability or an appropriate
sanction. Such a vote is significant, personal involvement in the
originating accusation. As the research data discussed above sup189
port, a Commissioner’s participation in the charging decision
creates “an unacceptable risk of actual bias.” It creates a serious
risk that the Commissioner will be psychologically wedded to the
Agency’s claim and, if later called on to sit in the case as an adjudicator, would be “influenced by an improper, if inadvertent, motive
to validate and preserve” a result upholding the original charged
190
violation.
C. Limited Effect of Applying Williams at the SEC
The remedy for applying Williams at the SEC is for a Commissioner to disqualify himself or herself from any adjudication for
which the Commissioner voted on the decision to authorize,
whether the vote was to commence or not to commence an enforcement proceeding. For several reasons discussed in this section, implementing that remedy would be feasible and would not
paralyze the SEC’s enforcement or adjudication function.
Williams would not require disqualifying every SEC Commissioner in every adjudication. It would apply only when a particular
Commissioner voted on the decision to commence the enforcement case. Usually, several years pass between a decision to initiate
an administrative enforcement case and Commission review of the
ALJ’s decision, as the examples discussed below illustrate. The
practice at the SEC is not for the Commissioners to hear and decide an enforcement case immediately after issuing charges, which
was the situation in Withrow. There can be turnover on the Commission between the time a case is commenced and the time it
comes before the Commission again after an ALJ decision. Some
Commissioners are likely to have left. New Commissioners face no
Williams disqualification issue because they did not participate in
188.
189.
190.

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.350, 201.460 (2018).
See supra Part II.C.
Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1907, 1908.
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authorizing the enforcement case. A Commissioner in office when
191
a case was initiated might not have participated in that decision.
The disqualification would apply only to a Commissioner who voted at the time of case initiation, was still in office at the time the
Commission reviewed the ALJ initial decision, and would have participated in the review of the ALJ decision absent the disqualification.
If the Williams rule applied and the Commission still had a
192
quorum, a majority would determine the outcome. The Commission typically can satisfy the quorum requirement even if several
193
Commissioners must disqualify themselves. A quorum can be as
small as two Commissioners when disqualifications occur. If the
Commission had a quorum for a final adjudication and divided
evenly over the disposition, it would dismiss the proceeding insti194
tuted against the defendant. As a result, if applying Williams re-

191. See discussion infra Part III.D.
192. 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (2018).
193. The quorum rule is complicated and depends on the number of Commissioners in
office and the number of Commissioners disqualified from a particular matter. Section
200.41 of the SEC’s Rules states:
A quorum of the Commission shall consist of three members; provided, however, that if the number of Commissioners in office is less than three, a quorum
shall consist of the number of members in office; and provided further that on any
matter of business as to which the number of members in office, minus the number of members who either have disqualified themselves from consideration of
such matter . . . or are otherwise disqualified from such consideration, is two, two
members shall constitute a quorum for purposes of such matter.
194. See, e.g., Ruggieri, Securities Act Release No. 10389, 2017 WL 2984863 (July 13,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2017/33-10389.pdf; Urban, Exchange Act
Release No. 66259, 2012 WL 1024025, at *2 n.5 (Jan. 26, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2012/34-66259.pdf (alteration in original):
Commission Rule of Practice 411(f), 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (“In the event a majority of participating Commissioners do not agree to a disposition on the merits,
the initial decision shall be of no effect, and an order will be issued in accordance
with this result.”); Steinberg, 58 S.E.C. 670 (2005) (dismissing proceeding where
the “Commission [was] evenly divided as to whether the allegations . . . [were] established”).
It is not clear why the Commission wrote a regulation choosing to dismiss an enforcement case entirely rather than allowing the ALJ’s initial decision to become final when a
majority of Commissioners did not agree on an outcome. The statutes do not require that
result, and, in fact, the APA and the Exchange Act contemplate treating an ALJ decision as
final agency action in some circumstances. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“When the presiding
employee makes an initial decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency
without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency
within time provided by rule.”); 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (same); see also Raymond J. Lucia Cos.
v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Commission could have chosen to adopt
regulations whereby an ALJ’s initial decision would be deemed a final decision of the Commission upon the expiration of a review period, without any additional Commission action.”) (emphasis in original), aff’d by an equally divided en banc court, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir.
2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). The Supreme Court affirms a decision of a court of ap-
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quired some Commissioners to disqualify themselves from reviewing an ALJ’s initial decision, the Commission would operate in the
normal fashion as long as the Commission had a quorum. The rule
from Williams would not prevent an agency from tapping the expertise and efficiency that some see as benefits from the combination of functions at the top level of the agency.
If the Commission did not have a quorum to review the particular case, two courses would be open. One would be to wait until the
Commission was able to form a quorum to review the case. The
other would be to adopt a regulation deeming an ALJ’s initial decision as the final decision of the Commission. The Commission
would need to amend its rules of practice to permit this second
195
approach.
The solution is not for the Commission to delegate to the staff
the power to authorize administrative enforcement cases. That
would not be effective because a defendant has a legal right to seek
the Commission’s consideration of a delegated decision and needs
to persuade only a single Commissioner to call for Commission re196
view. Furthermore, delegating the decision to initiate enforcement proceedings would allow Commissioners to shirk responsibility and accountability for one of the fundamental functions for
which the President nominated and the Senate confirmed them.
D. Examples of Applying Williams at the SEC
How the Williams rule would affect SEC administrative enforcement cases would depend on the specific circumstances of each
case. This section provides three examples by applying the Williams
rule to actual cases on which the Commission ruled. In one, the
Williams rule would have resulted in dismissal of all charges against

peals when, after granting review, the justices are equally divided. See, e.g., United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
195. According to the District of Columbia Circuit, the SEC’s current regulations require that for every case decided by an ALJ, the Commission must either review the decision
or issue a finality order under Rule 360(d)(2), Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286, a conclusion the Supreme Court’s reversal did not appear to disturb, see Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2054
(2018). The Commission may not take such an action without a quorum, and it is unclear
what would happen if the Commission did not have a quorum to decide the case, issue the
finality order, or review a decision by the Office of the General Counsel to issue a finality
order pursuant to delegated authority. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-14(g)(1)(iii) (2018). In principle,
it seems acceptable to solve this issue with a regulation deeming the ALJ decision as final
when a quorum is absent. See supra note 194.
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 201.430 (2018).
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the defendant, which also had been the ALJ’s initial decision. The
rule would not have affected the result in the second case and, in
the third case, would have left the Commission without a quorum,
at least temporarily. The examples show that the Commission
would be able to retain its power to charge and to perform its adjudication function, although it would need to make some adjust197
ment for occasions when it could not muster a quorum.
In Flannery, the Commissioners authorized fraud charges against
198
two defendants on September 30, 2010. The five Commissioners
in office in September 2010 were Chairman Schapiro and Commissioners Casey, Walter, Aguilar, and Paredes, but Commissioners
Casey and Walter did not participate in the vote to bring the
199
case. The case went to an administrative law judge, who rejected
all charges and found in favor of the defendants. The staff appealed to the full Commission, then comprising Chair White and
Commissioners Aguilar, Gallagher, Piwowar, and Stein. At the end
of 2014, three of the five Commissioners, Chair White and Commissioners Aguilar and Stein, disagreed with the ALJ and found
that each defendant had committed a violation. Commissioners
200
Gallagher and Piwowar dissented. One of the Commissioners
197. More research could be done to estimate the number of adjudications that would
likely be affected by applying the Williams rule at the SEC and other agencies. The research
could consider how often Commissioners depart and new Commissioners arrive, how much
time usually elapses between a charging decision and a final Commission vote on an appeal
from an ALJ decision, how often Commissioners who voted on a decision to commence an
enforcement case were still Commissioners at the time of an adjudication vote, and how often a quorum of Commissioners would have existed.
198. Flannery, Securities Act Release No. 9147, 2010 WL 3826277 (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/33-9147.pdf.
199. The SEC website has information about Commissioner votes on instituting enforcement charges and other matters. See Final Commissioner Votes (April 2006 - December 2015),
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/foia/foia-votes.shtml (last updated Feb. 19, 2016). The copy of
the order instituting proceedings in Flannery in this material shows that Commissioners Casey and Walter did not participate. See Final Commissioner Votes (September 2010), SEC, https://
www.sec.gov/foia/docs/votes/2010-09.pdf (last updated Feb. 19, 2016) (listed in hyperlink
as document number 80 of 82, and showing a handwritten note on a photocopy of the original order that indicates these two commissioners did not participate). SEC records also indicate when a Commissioner disapproved of an action. See, e.g., Linton, Exchange Act Release No. 67912, 104 SEC Docket 2663, 2012 WL 4320219, at *1 (Sept. 21, 2012), https://
www.sec.gov/foia/docs/votes/2012-09.pdf (listed in hyperlink as document number 50 of
75, and showing a handwritten note on a photocopy of the original order that indicates two
commissioners did not participate, while another participated but disapproved of the action
ultimately taken by the Commission).
200. Flannery, Securities Act Release No. 9689, Exchange Act Release No. 73840, Investment Company Act Release No. 31374, 110 SEC Docket 2463, 2014 WL 7145625 (Dec.
15, 2014). Chair White and Commissioners Aguilar and Stein were in the majority. Commissioners Gallagher and Piwowar dissented without a separate opinion. Id. at *41. The defendants appealed to a court of appeals, which found for the defendants and vacated the SEC
decision. Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).
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who participated in the SEC’s review of the ALJ decision, Commissioner Aguilar, had participated in authorizing the case in 2010.
He was in the three-two majority of Commissioners disagreeing
with the ALJ’s initial decision. If he had been disqualified from the
review of the ALJ initial decision, the Commission vote probably
would have been two-two, making the Commission evenly divided
on whether the allegations in the charging document had been es201
tablished and leading the Commission to dismiss the charges.
In Lucia, the Commission authorized charges in September
202
2012. The Commission consisted of Chairman Schapiro and
Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, Walter, and Gallagher, although
203
Commissioner Aguilar did not participate. An ALJ issued an initial decision finding liability based on misrepresentations and imposing sanctions, including a lifetime industry bar of Raymond Lu204
Both the staff and the defendants appealed to the
cia.
Commission, then consisting of Chair White and Commissioners
Aguilar, Stein, Gallagher, and Piwowar. With a three-two vote in
2015, the Commission found that the defendants had committed
fraud violations, added a violation that the ALJ rejected, and im205
posed the same sanctions that the ALJ had. Chair White and
Commissioners Aguilar and Stein were in the majority, while
206
Commissioners Gallagher and Piwowar dissented. Only Commissioner Gallagher participated in both the charging decision and
the final adjudication. If Commissioner Gallagher had been disqualified, the vote would have been three-one, and the outcome
would have been the same.

201. If a majority of the Commissioners does not agree to the disposition on the merits
of an ALJ’s initial decision, the Commission dismisses the proceeding instituted against the
defendant. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
202. Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 3456, Investment Company Act
Release No. 67781, 104 SEC Docket 2130, 2012 WL 3838150, at *1 (Sept. 5, 2012), https://
www.sec.gov/foia/docs/votes/2012-09.pdf (showing a photocopy of the original order with
a handwritten note indicating that Commissioner Aguilar did not participate in the proceeding).
203. Id.
204. Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 540, 107 SEC Docket 4365, 2013
WL 6384274 (ALJ Dec. 6, 2013), modifying Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release
No. 495, 106 SEC Docket 3613, 2013 WL 3379719 (ALJ July 8, 2013).
205. Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 4190, Investment Company Act
Release No. 75837, 112 SEC Docket 1754, 2015 WL 5172953 (Sept. 3, 2015). The defendants
appealed to the D.C. Circuit and sought review in the Supreme Court on a constitutional
question. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), aff’d by an equally divided en banc court, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
206. Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 4190, Investment Company Act
Release No. 75837, 112 SEC Docket 1754, 2015 WL 5172953, at *28 (Sept. 3, 2015).
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In September 2014, Chair White plus Commissioners Aguilar
and Piwowar voted to charge an investment adviser with fraud and
to seek financial and other sanctions in an SEC administrative proceeding. Commissioner Stein and one other Commissioner did not
207
participate. An administrative law judge tried the case and dis208
missed all of the charges. The SEC staff appealed to the Commission. When the Commission decided the appeal in 2016, only
three Commissioners were in office: Chair White and Commissioners Stein and Piwowar. The three Commissioners decided that
the ALJ had been wrong and that some of the original charges
should be upheld. They found violations by the investment adviser,
imposed a civil money penalty, and issued a cease and desist or209
der. If the Williams rule had been in effect, Chair White and
Commissioner Piwowar would have disqualified themselves, leaving
only Commissioner Stein to vote on the case. She had not participated in the vote to initiate the proceeding. In those circumstances, one Commissioner does not make a quorum, 210 and the Commission would have had no power to act. The case would have
remained pending until another Commissioner created a quorum.
The three examples show a range of possible outcomes from
applying Williams at the SEC. The due process protection would
have mattered in two of the three cases. In the first case, one
Commissioner who had voted to charge also participated in the final adjudication. He again voted against the defendants. If he had
been excluded, the charges against the defendants would have
failed. In the second case, only one Commissioner participated in
both the initiation and adjudication of the case. He voted in favor
of bringing the case but then changed his mind at the adjudication
stage. He rose above the potential bias, but a majority of the
Commissioners still found the defendants liable. In the third case,
only three Commissioners were in office at the time of the adjudication and two of them had voted to charge the defendant. They
then both voted in favor of the defendant’s liability. The Commis207. See Robare Group, Ltd., Securities Act Release No. 3907, Investment Company Act
Release No. 72950, 109 SEC Docket, 4294, 2014 WL 4296690, at *1 (Sept. 2, 2014), https://
www.sec.gov/foia/docs/votes/2014-09.pdf (including a photocopy of the original Order
Instituting Administrative Cease and Desist Proceedings, which bears a handwritten notation
indicating that Commissioners Gallagher and Stein did not participate).
208. Robare Group, Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 806, 111 SEC Docket 3765, 2015
WL 3507108 (ALJ June 4, 2015) (Initial Decision).
209. Robare Group, Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 4566, 115 SEC Docket 2796, 2016
WL 6596009 (Nov. 7, 2016). Commissioner Piwowar, who, along with Chair White, had initially voted to charge the adviser, ultimately disagreed with imposing a penalty.
210. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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sion would not have had a quorum if those two Commissioners had
been disqualified. The result of Commission review by an untainted quorum is unknown.
CONCLUSION
For decades, constitutional and administrative law has depended
on Withrow v. Larkin for the principle that the Due Process Clause
does not forbid federal agencies from combining the ability to
conduct investigations into potential misconduct, commence proceedings alleging violations of law, and make final agency decisions
that find a violation and impose sanctions. That position might still
be valid if the question is broadly whether an administrative agency, as an institution, may combine those functions without offending due process or separation of powers concepts, but Williams v.
Pennsylvania appears to require a partial step back from that broad
position. Williams held that an unconstitutional potential for bias
exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator
in a case.
The facts of Williams concerned a state court judge who, years
earlier, had approved a decision to seek the death penalty in a
criminal case, but the reasoning of the Court’s decision was not so
confined. The reasoning expressed constitutional doubt about the
ability of an advocate to maintain the necessary neutrality to decide
the merits of a case fairly and was consistent with other Court decisions requiring impartial adjudicators when the decision maker
was a judge or an executive official acting in a judicial capacity.
Given the importance and high value of impartiality in adjudicatory settings, the rule in Williams likely applies to federal administrative agencies.
If courts agree that Williams applies to federal agencies, an agency head, such as a commissioner, will not be able to vote to initiate
an administrative enforcement proceeding and then later sit as a
judge reviewing an initial ALJ decision in that case. Combining
those roles is the standard procedure at many federal agencies,
such as the SEC, FTC, and FCC, and it would need to change. The
change, on its face, would be dramatic. It would be at odds with
the common understanding established by Withrow and section
554(d) of the APA and with the views of those who see pragmatic
value in the combination of charging and adjudicating functions.
In reality, applying Williams to federal agencies would have a limited effect if the example of the SEC is a reliable guide. Because of
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the availability of new or different agency heads in most if not all
cases, an agency would be able to review an ALJ’s initial decision
with a quorum of commissioners or agency heads who had not participated in the original decision to charge the defendant. If, for
some reason, a quorum was not available within a reasonable time,
an agency could allow the ALJ’s decision to become the final position of the agency.

